Monamy's descriptions that many scientists, philosophers and especially policy-makers regularly make such arbitrary distinctions. For example, since 1971, the United States Federal Animal Act protects all warmblooded animals except birds, rats and mice; the latter account for 95% of all experimental animals. Only in the last few months has this policy exemption been overturned (Malakoff 2001) . As Monamy points out, one often draws the line for restricting certain experiments on certain species based on remarkably subjective criteria, typically whether one can 'identify' with the expressions of the animal in question. Monamy cites Galen's use of pigs for neuroanatomy because he wanted to '. . . avoid seeing the unpleasant expression of the ape . . . ' (pp. 8-9) undergoing the same procedure. Although the meaning underlying the expressions of some species may be opaque to us, these days, one is hard pressed to identify differences in the cognitive capacities of such disparate taxa as birds and primates: Both seem to have capacities that were at one time thought to be the hallmark of the human mind (Hare et al. 2000; Emery & Clayton 2001) . Thus, as the philosopher Jeremy Bentham observed, 'The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?' (page 18).
Monamy concludes his book with a chapter on the replacement, reduction and refinement in animal experimental procedures (the 'three R's'): what exactly they mean and how they can be put to practice. Refinement, for instance, may include developing better anaesthesia/ analgesia protocols and animal husbandry. Central to these two aspects of refinement is an understanding of the natural behaviour of the species under consideration. While the importance of this point may seem obvious to readers of this journal, it is not obvious to the average biomedical scientist who has not, for example, seen a rhesus macaque romping in the wild or grooming a conspecific. As Monamy points out, knowing your animal aids not only in the development of a speciesappropriate captive environment, but also in the recognition of species-inappropriate behaviour that may indicate pain or stress (Knight 2001) . In the light of this concept, my one criticism of Monamy's book is that it does not review the excellent empirical work investigating ways to improve animal welfare in captivity (Dawkins 1998; Mason et al. 1998) . These novel ways of assessing animal welfare emphasize the role of the animals' own choices and reinforcement behaviour.
Ultimately, Monamy's book provides a thoughtful consideration of both the pros and cons of animal research. Animal Experimentation is an excellent guide to the issues that current teachers of biology and biomedical science should take note of. With this book as a tool, training in the biomedical sciences no longer has to resemble that of the military. Investigators can give their students a more balanced view of the needs of their 'alien' subjects. Monamy's engaging and direct fashion will appeal to even the most impatient of undergraduates, and this slim book could easily be read and discussed during the first week of a basic biology class. I expect that those unfamiliar with the animal welfare debate, both inside and outside the classroom, will benefit enormously from reading Animal Experimentation. ASIF A. GHAZANFAR Max Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, Spemannstrasse 38, 72076 Tübingen, Germany Natural selection is in essence an economic activity, generating a form of efficiency that can be measured in terms of reproductive success (Frank 1998). It is therefore not surprising that many of the approaches that have proved so successful in evolutionary biology, most notably game theory, were originally developed with economic applications in mind (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944) . In this book Noë, van Hoof & Hammerstein have collected together a series of contributions by evolutionary biologists, social scientists and anthropologists. While each contribution discusses specific insights about the systems they describe, the majority have also attempted to take a more economically conscious perspective than we typically see. The rationale is a good one. Given the common ground, there is a real possibility that some of the questions that evolutionary biologists have been grappling with have already been tackled by economists, at least at some level. In turn, it should be noted some of the answers that economists have been able to provide to their own problems may be based on the simplifying assumption of rational behaviour, and therefore better suited to understanding the outcomes of evolutionary processes. Thus, developing an economic perspective and nomenclature, at the very least, reminds biologists of the deeper unifying themes both within their own fields and between separate disciplines. If we get good at thinking about and discussing natural systems in economic terms, then it can only serve to enhance dialogue and increase the rate of exchange of empirical results and theoretical advances between these traditionally different departments.
Does the book work? I believe it does, although I have some reservations, which I raise later. To see just how an economic approach can be useful, take the example of partner choice, which is considered in detail by Noë. It has long been recognized that partner choice may play a fundamental role in sexual selection, but its potential
